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Putin, Lavrov, Shoigu Presents the Mirror Response to US Unfriendly Steps

Putin, Lavrov, Shoigu Presents the Mirror Response to US Unfriendly Steps
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    Please, I will ask the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sergey Viktorovich, to state the situation that is currently developing with the Treaty on Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles and in general on the so-called disarmament dossier.
    What happens in offensive arms limitation?
    Mr. President,
    Under the Treaty on Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles - and the contract, as you know, has been in effect since 1988 - according to our data,
    the United States began to violate this indefinite contract since 1999, when they began to experience combat unmanned aerial vehicles that coincide with the characteristics forbidden The treaty ground-based cruise missiles.
    Subsequently, they began to use target missiles, ballistic target missiles, to test their missile defense system, and from 2014 they started deploying launchers in Europe for their own positional defense missile areas - Mk 41 launchers are suitable without any changes and for launching Tomahawk medium-range percussion missiles.
    This is a direct violation of the Treaty.
    This is a direct violation of the Treaty. Now such installations have already been deployed in Romania, and are preparing for deployment in Poland, as well as in Japan.
    We are also concerned about the fact that quite recently, a year ago, the United States Nuclear Policy Review set the task of building low-yield nuclear munitions, which are likely to be used on medium-range missiles.
    And the other day it was announced that this provision of the nuclear doctrine is already moving into a practical plane - the production of such missiles begins.
    In October, the United States officially announced that they were going to withdraw from the Treaty on Medium and Short Range Missiles.
    We sought to do everything to save this Treaty, given the importance it has for maintaining strategic stability both in Europe and in the world as a whole.
    And the last time such attempts were made on January 15, when, finally, at our request, the Americans agreed to hold appropriate consultations in Geneva.
    We have proposed, in coordination with the Ministry of Defense, unprecedented transparency measures that go far beyond our obligations under this Treaty in order to convince the Americans that we are not violating this crucial document.
    These attempts, these proposals were torpedoed by the Americans and instead they gave us an ultimatum once again, which, of course, we cannot accept, since it contradicts the letter and spirit of the Treaty itself.
    The Americans announced the suspension of their participation in the Treaty on Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, the beginning of the procedure for the formal withdrawal from this Treaty and announced that they would not consider themselves bound by the obligations under this document.
    That is, they will produce rockets, as far as can be understood, in addition to those R & D that are already authorized in the current budget.
    This situation, of course, aggravates the situation that has developed in recent years as a whole in the field of nuclear disarmament and strategic stability.
    It all began with the 1972 Missile Defense Treaty, when in 2002, you know this very well, the Americans announced their withdrawal from this Treaty.
    This was done, despite numerous attempts by the Russian Federation through the UN General Assembly to save this Treaty, a series of resolutions were adopted in support of the ABM Treaty, but this did not stop the United States.
    In a partial replacement of this Treaty, the Americans signed a joint Declaration on New Strategic Relations with us in the same 2002, promising that, as part of its implementation,
    it would be possible to resolve the problems of the so-called third missile defense position region that was unfolding at that time in Europe.
    The Declaration provided for consultations to search for agreements.
    This did not happen because of the unwillingness of the United States to really consider our concerns.
    In 2007, we once again showed goodwill; on your instructions, an initiative was launched to cooperate in solving the problems of the third position area on US missile defense in Europe.
    The Americans again avoided it.
    But in 2010, at the Russia-NATO summit in Lisbon, we once again spoke in favor of creating missile defense on our common continent with the collective forces of Russia, the USA and Europe.
    This call was not heard.
    And although a couple of years later, in 2012, in NATO at NATO's NATO summit in Chicago, NATO members themselves spoke in favor of a dialogue with Russia on missile defense, all this goodwill, so to speak,
    was reduced to the fact that the Americans insisted that we they simply accepted their approach to the organization of this missile defense, although this approach was fraught with obvious risks and threats to our security.
    In 2013, I recall, we once again called on the State Department to begin consultations and sent specific proposals.
    There was no answer.
    And in 2014, the United States announced the cessation of the dialogue on missile defense and are now deploying positional areas in Europe and Asia and are strengthening their respective systems in Alaska, including on the east coast.
    And if we talk about other important instruments of international security and strategic stability, we are also worried about the approach of the United States towards fulfilling its obligations under such a universal treaty as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
    Because, despite our numerous reminders, the United States, within the framework of NATO, is committing serious violations of this Treaty.
    The treaty provides for the obligations of the nuclear powers not to transfer appropriate technologies for the use of nuclear weapons.
    Contrary to this, the so-called joint nuclear missions are being conducted in NATO, in which the United States, together with the five NATO countries on whose territory American nuclear weapons are deployed, develops the use of nuclear weapons with the participation of countries that are not members of the nuclear five.
    This is a direct violation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
    Another Treaty that played a special role, or rather, the preparation of which played a special role in the hopes that are associated with the elimination of additional threats of nuclear war, is the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.
    The United States did not ratify this treaty despite the fact that Barack Obama, running for president, made it one of his election commitments.
    Well, now in general this is not the case, the United States has lost all interest in any consultations on how they could join this Treaty.
    Russia as a bona fide party to this Treaty annually holds special events at the General Assembly aimed at shaping and mobilizing world public opinion in favor of the entry into force of the Treaty, which, in particular, requires the United States to accede to it.
    Well, one more remaining after the INF Treaty is in force - a treaty on strategic offensive arms.
    It is also crucial in order to maintain at least some strategic stability, global parity.
    It is also threatened because its overall effective operation is called into question by the fact that the United States recently decided to deduct 56 submarine launchers for launching the Tridents and 41 heavy bomber on the pretext that they are being converted into non-nuclear equipment.
    This is allowed by the contract, but the second party has every right to make sure that this conversion is implemented in such a way as to exclude the return potential, so that it is impossible to technically return these converted equipment.
    Inspection is needed.
    Yes, and there must be technical means that will convince us that this conversion cannot be reversed, and again bring these systems into nuclear design.
    We have been talking since 2015 to make sure that the United States is fulfilling its obligations on this particular issue.
    No result yet.
    The technical solutions offered to us do not allow us to make sure that all this will not create an opportunity for the return of a huge number of warheads - more than 1200 warheads would return to nuclear circulation.
    And, unfortunately, the repeated Russian proposals to start negotiations now on how to extend the Strategic Arms Treaty after the 2021, when its first term expires, do not find a response from the United States.
    They merely declare that a decision on the fate of the START Treaty has not yet been made.
    In general, the situation is alarming.
    And I repeat that the decision taken by the United States on the INF Treaty, of course, is of great concern throughout the world, especially in Europe.
    Although the Europeans went along with American policy, all NATO members expressed unequivocal support for the US position,
    which refuses to discuss mutual concerns with us and is limited to an ultimatum so that we unilaterally take measures without any justification unfounded accusations.
    Thank you.
    Mr. Shoygu, how does the Ministry of Defense assess the current situation? And what are your suggestions in this regard?
    Mr. President, despite the vagueness of the wording, it is obvious to us that in addition to the open-ended research work on the production of medium-range and shorter-range missiles, we have been witnessing for several years the real violation of the Treaty's positions.
    Simply put, the United States has begun to manufacture these missiles.
    In this regard, we have proposals for response measures, which are as follows.
    The first. This is the discovery of the NIR and OCD in the coming months on the re-binding or use of the sea-based launchers of the Caliber missile in the ground version.
    The second. This discovery is also an R & D project that turns into developmental work on the creation of ground-based complexes of hypersonic medium-range and shorter-range ballistic missiles.
    Please support our proposal.
    I agree.
    We will proceed as follows. Our answer will be a mirror.
    American partners have announced that they are suspending their participation in the Treaty, and we are suspending.
    They announced that they are engaged in R & D and development work, and we will do the same.
    I agree with the proposals of the Ministry of Defense about the start of work on the "landing" of Caliber and the opening of a new direction - the creation of a medium-range hypersonic land-based rocket.
    At the same time, I want to draw your attention to the fact that we should not and will not be drawn into the expensive arms race for us.
    And my question to you is this: will we be able to carry out this work within the framework of the available budget assignments for the Ministry of Defense in 2019 and the following years?
    Mr. President, we have examined this issue in detail, in the coming days we will propose an adjustment of the budget for 2019, which will allow us to carry out this work in the amounts provided for for this year, without any increase.
    Without an increase in the budget of the Ministry of Defense.
    Yes.
    Fine.
    In this regard, I have another request for you.
    We regularly hold meetings in Sochi on the execution of state defense orders, every six months, with the participation of our military commanders, the commanders of the species and genera of the Armed Forces, and with the participation of industry representatives.
    Starting this year, I propose to somewhat change the format of our work.
    I want to see how work is going on putting our new complexes on combat duty: Dagger (hypersonic air-launched missile), Peresvet (combat laser weapons), he also entered the troops, Avant-garde, the final tests of which we finished, and there is already production at the enterprises in a series.
    I want to see how the work on the production of Sarmat, and the preparation for its statement on combat duty.
    A few days ago, you reported to me about the completion of the key test phase of the unmanned multipurpose and strategic range of the Poseidon submarine military weapon.
    We need to see how the work goes on here.
    And we know about the plans of some countries to place weapons in space.
    I want to hear about how this possible threat will be stopped too.
    Now one more important thing that I would like to say about the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense.
    We have repeatedly for many years, constantly raising the issue of holding meaningful disarmament negotiations on almost all of its aspects.
    And in recent years, we see that our initiatives are not supported by partners.
    On the contrary, all the time, some pretexts are being sought for dismantling the already established system of international security.
    In this regard, I would like to stress and ask the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense to be guided by the following considerations.
    All our proposals, as before, in this area remain on the table, the doors for negotiations are open.
    At the same time, I ask both departments to not initiate any negotiations on this issue in the future.
    Let us wait until our partners are ripe in order to conduct an equal, meaningful dialogue with us on this crucial topic - both for us and for our partners, and for the whole world.
    And one more important consideration that I would like to convey to the heads of both departments.
    We presume that Russia will not deploy if such weapons appear, either in Europe or in other regions of the world, medium and shorter range weapons until such weapons of American manufacture appear in their respective regions of the world.
    I ask both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense to carefully observe what will happen and promptly report proposals for our reaction to current events.
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